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Abstract 
On August 10 1985, during completion of reactor refueling work on a nuclear 
submarine at Chazhma Cove near Vladivostok, an uncontrolled chain reaction occurred. 
The air, ground and water were radioactively contaminated. The Vladivostok region 
(southern Primoriye Kray) still contains several nuclear fleet facilities where periodic 
refueling of operating submarines is carried out.  In addition, there are about 60 
decommissioned submarines that have been waiting for many years for final defueling. 
This causes increasing concern, as the probability of another nuclear accident is not 
negligible. In order to assess the consequences, the atmospheric transport analysis of 
radioactive nuclides released from a submarine facility in southern Primoriye Kray was 
evaluated using the computer code WSPEEDI.  The WSPEEDI code consists of a mass 
consistent wind model WSYNOP for a large scale wind fields and a particle random 
walk model GEARN for atmospheric dispersion and dry deposition of radioactivity.  A 
parametric study of transboundary atmospheric transport of radioactivity for a 1 Bq unit 
release in the vicinity of Vladivostok was carried out to determine the sensitivity of the 
consequences to the height of the release and its duration. Atmospheric concentrations 
and soil concentrations due to dry deposition over Japanese and Korean coastal areas, 
and corresponding internal and external doses accumulated during passage of the 
contaminated cloud, were calculated. The results showed that in a case of northeast 
winds, which are predominant in winter season, the contaminated air could reach Japan 
in one to three days depending on the wind velocities. The maximum concentration 
values over Japan occur in a release within the boundary layer (up to 1000 m). The 
nuclide concentration depend also on the release duration, with the highest 
concentrations occurring as a result of release durations of 16 to 60 min. The 
accumulated radiation doses depend on the concentration and the residence time over 
the ground. Evaluation of a severe accident was carried out using core inventory data 
for 134Cs, 137Cs, 90Sr, 131I, 133I, 135I  from a NATO study of an accident near Murmansk.  
Use of these values reveals that doses accumulated during cloud passage, including both 
external irradiation due to cloud immersion and internal doses from inhalation will not 
exceed the 1 mSv limit in countries adjacent to Russia. Suggestions for extensions of 
this analysis are presented.  
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Introduction 
A spontaneous chain reaction in a submarine nuclear reactor occurred in August 1985, 
several months before the Chernobyl accident. The submarine accident and the resulting 
environmental damage in the area were a closely guarded secret for several years after 
the accident.  In spite of previous accidents and the negligence of the personnel 
responsible for reactor maintenance, adequate precautions to limit nuclear accidents 
were not taken.  Nine months later, Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
suffered a severe accident which contaminated Scandinavia and a large part of the 
territories of Central Europe. 
 
Major naval ports housing nuclear powered submarines are situated near Murmansk 
(Murmansk Oblast), Vladivostok (Primoriye Kray), and Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka 
Oblast).  Many retired submarines are currently waiting for decommissioning and a new 
nuclear accident could result in severe consequences in neighboring countries.  Official 
data for the number of the submarines is not available, but it is considered that there are 
about 60 retired submarine moored in Pacific fleet bases, with a very limited staff on the 
board, and about 40 submarines are still in service in the Far East. Most of the 
submarines waiting for decommissioning have two nuclear reactors fueled with highly 
enriched (20-45%) uranium. The number of the nuclear reactors expected to eventually 
require decommissioning thus exceeds 100. Navy nuclear-powered submarine facilities 
for the Pacific Fleet are concentrated near Vladivostok, in Primoriye Kray. A major 
nuclear submarine overhaul and refueling yard is situated on the west coast of Dunai 
peninsula at Bolshoi Kamen, approximately 40 km from Vladivostok across Ussuriy 
Bay, and a small refueling yard on the east coast of the Dunai Peninsula, situated in a 
small inlet of Strelok Bay known as Chazhma Cove.  A nuclear storage and disposal site 
is located in the tip of the peninsula [5]. 
 
Given that the 1985 Chazhma Cove accident occurred in southern Primoriye Kray, the 
research in this paper is focused on studying climate particularities and the potential for 
atmospheric transport from the Vladivostok area.  This study estimates the potential for  
transboundary atmospheric transport of radioactive nuclides and the consequences to 
countries near to the Vladivostok area, namely, Japan and Korea. 
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Chazhma Cove Accident 
In August 1985 a spontaneous chain reaction occurred during regular refueling 
operation on a nuclear submarine in Chazhma Cove. The accident occurred after the 
completion of refueling operations, after the reactor pressure vessel lid failed a 
leaktightness test. The workers decided to correct the problem without informing 
supervisory personnel.  The lid was unfastened and lifted several centimeters, when an 
accidental movement of the crane holding the lid occurred.  This resulted in movement 
of the control rods, resulting in a reactivity insertion which caused a power excursion.  
The power excursion resulted in a steam explosion which ejected core structural 
components from the vessel. The power of the reactivity accident was estimated to be 
5x1018 fissions, and the duration of the main radionuclide release was estimated as less 
than one minute.   
 
After the nuclear explosion, a fire broke out and the release of nuclear materials 
continued for four hours until the fire was extinguished. According to [11] the 
radioactive materials, iodine and activated products (60Co, 54Mn) blown out in the 
atmosphere were estimated to amount to 1.85x1017 Bq and the released noble gases 
amounted to 8x1016 Bq.  During that day, south-east winds predominated with low 
cloud coverage of 10 points and periodical drizzling occurred. The radionuclide was 
deposited in an area of 2 km2 in a forest in a narrow plume 3.5 km long and 200-650 m 
wide, in a northwest direction from the place of the explosion.  The water and the 
bottom of the Chazhma Cove were contaminated mainly with 60Co and partly with 137Cs 
[11]. Due to the propitious wind condition and to the drizzling, contamination was not 
detected in Vladivostok. Most of the nuclides were deposited on the peninsula.  
However, ten people died in the explosion, and during the clean-up operations 290 
people were overirradiated [11].  
Risk of Another Submarine Accident and Long Range Contamination 
Decommissioning operations include a process for unloading spent fuel.  This procedure 
is similar to the first half of a normal refueling operation.  The risk of a reactivity 
accident during refueling/defueling is estimated to be approximately 0.38% [6] per 
operation.  Assuming that refueling and defueling operations are subject to equal 
probabilities for a reactivity accident,  and that 200 defueling will need to be performed 
in the next 10 years, a rough estimation of 0.76 accidents can be expected for this 
period. 
8 
Figure 1. Mean January sea surface pressure (hPa). 
 
 
 
 
 
General Atmospheric Circulation Patterns in East Asian Coastal Regions  
Figure 1 shows the mean January sea surface pressure system. A strong cold anticyclone 
is usually situated in the north continental parts in winter up to altitudes of 500 hPa. It is 
a shallow low-level phenomenon, and is the strongest one in the Northern Hemisphere 
during the winter season. Two low-pressure zones are occur in winter: one is situated in 
the North Pacific, known as the Aleutian Low, and the other is situated near Australia 
and New Guinea, and is known as the Equatorial Low. The pressure field causes 
streaming from the Asian High to the Aleutian Low, resulting in a flow path on the 
Russian eastern coast from the inner continental system to the coastal regions. 
Northwestern winds therefore prevail in the Vladivostok region, and the air transport is 
towards the Japanese Islands. Southward streaming from the Asian High to the 
Equatorial Low can also influence the wind system, causing air masses to move to south 
and influence Korea. The mean (over 20 years, from 1976 to 1996) horizontal wind 
velocities in January at pressure 1000 hPa (Figure 2) [9], showed mean surface wind 
speeds at Vladivostok of more than 10 m/s. 
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Figure 2. Mean January 1000 mB winds, 1976-1996. 
Figure 3. Mean July sea surface pressure hPa. 
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The pressure field in summer season (Figure 3) is dominated by the extensive low  
pressure system in Northern India, Pakistan and Southwest China, which is the strongest 
one during that time, and the Subtropical high pressure system, which is situated in the 
North Pacific, east of Japan. The summer surface wind is characterized by easterly 
winds and the transport of air masses from Vladivostok is toward the continent, where 
the masses travel up into Russia and can also influence China.  
 
Monsoons, formed by the difference of the underlying surface; the cold wind, a strong 
and fast anticyclone with large pressure gradients (in winter); mesoscale processes as 
breeze effect and slope winds; and typhoons (in summer), can also contribute to the 
climate particularities. However, some of these processes influence the wind system 
only for a short time, and the others are less powerful than the synoptic formations. In 
this study we therefore do not account for these types of atmospheric processes. 
 
Description of the Simulation 
The simulations of the particle transport are made using the large scale model 
WSPEEDI.  This model uses observations and measurements by the member nations of 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). We investigate the possibility of 
radioactive contamination in Japan and Korea, where the wind flow and particle 
transport is toward these two countries in winter.  Wind field measurement data from 
January 1997 is therefore used for this study as representative of weather patterns most 
likely to affect Japan or Korea.  The distance between Vladivostok and Japan varies 
from 700 to 1000 km.  The distance to Korea is about 400 km (Figure 1).  
 
Wind Field Analysis for January 1997 
The analysis of different meteorological conditions over the Sea of Japan, Russian far 
eastern coasts, and the Japanese islands show predominately north or northwest winds. 
During winter the temperature falls below –20 degrees and the wind values can vary 
from less than 5 m/s to about 20 m/s. The atmospheric transport has two typical 
directions: one is toward the Japanese islands and the other is toward North Korea. 
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Figure 4. Geographical map of the Sea of Japan, Vladivostok and Japanese Islands 
 
The WSPEEDI calculations for the horizontal components of the wind field for different 
dates in January 1997 are shown in Figure 5.  The  three patterns shown indicate the 
most common weather patterns during the month.  Figure 5a illustrates the pattern 
denoted as the Strong North Winds (SNW) case, with horizontal velocities of about 20 
m/s toward Japan Islands. This condition is accepted as extreme for the long-range 
radionuclide transport. The pattern shown in Figure 5b exhibits wind velocities of less 
than 5 m/s and it is distinguished as Weak North Wind condition (WNW). Figure 5c 
demonstrates a more complicated situation in which the wind rotates over Korea and the 
Japanese island, and is termed the Cyclonic Wind (CW) case.  These three wind 
conditions serve as a base for the analyses of the atmospheric radionuclide 
concentration, ground deposition and radiation doses. 
 
In the study several different simulation conditions were analyzed in order to cover a 
large number of possibilities in a nuclear submarine accident. Three parameters 
(duration of the release, height of the release, and nuclide released) were varied. The 
structure of the experiment is summarized in Table 1. 
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Figure 5. Wind field patterns  
A) Strong North Winds (SNW) 
B) Weak North Winds (WNW) 
C) Cyclonic Wind (CW) 
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Table 1. Structure of the simulations modeled using WSPEEDI 
Wind condition Strong North-
west Wind 
Weak   North 
–west  Wind 
Cyclonic 
North Wind 
Wind velocity 15-20 m/s > 5 m/s 10 m/s 
Level of 
analysis 
25 m 
Calculation of 
concentration, external 
and internal doses, 
ground deposition at 
fixed duration of the 
release 16 min and 
fixed unit release 1 Bq 
     131I 
     133I 
     135I 
     134Cs 
     137Cs 
      90Sr 
     131I 
     133I 
     135I 
     134Cs 
     137Cs 
      90Sr 
     131I 
     133I 
     135I 
     134Cs 
     137Cs 
      90Sr 
 
75 m 
 
75 m 
950 m 950 m 
Level of 
analysis 
25 m 
Variation of the  height 
of release point at fixed 
duration of the release  
16 min and fixed unit 
release 1 Bq 
2500 m 
(137Cs) 
2500 m 
(137Cs) 
 
 
- 
16 min 16 min 16 min 
1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 
Level of 
analysis  
25 m 
Variation of the 
duration of  the release 
at fixed height 75m and 
fixed unit release of 1 
Bq 24 hours 
(137Cs) 
24 hours 
(137Cs) 
24 hours 
(137Cs) 
Calculations for concentration at 
different levels 
Level 1- Level 10 
(corresponding to 50 , 171.05, 334.21, 539.47, 
786.84, 1076.32, 1407.89, 1781.58, 2197.37, 
2655.26 m)  
 
The calculations of a hypothetical radionuclide release are made for three representative 
days in January 1997.  Because data on relative humidity or precipitation was not 
available, wet deposition was not simulated.  
Brief Description of WSPEEDI  
The computer code WSPEEDI (Worldwide System for Prediction of Environmental 
Emergency Dose Information) was developed at JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Institute) [1,2,3,7]. WSPEEDI is a system for prediction of radiological 
impacts due to a nuclear accident. The code adjusts the wind field values in a grid 
system and simulates long-range transport of radionuclides. WSPEEDI consists of a 
mass-consistent wind model (WSYNOP) for generation of large-scale wind fields and a 
particle random walk model (GEARN) for simulation of atmospheric dispersion and dry 
and wet deposition of radioactivity. The simulations can be performed on a hemispheric 
scale, and the vertical dimension is the top of the troposphere (10 km). The model is 
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formulated with reference to a terrain-following height coordinate on ten standard 
pressure levels and horizontal transformed map coordinates with map scale factor m. It 
uses a horizontal resolution of 50 km and a temporal resolution of 6 h. 
 
WSYNOP has two procedures. The first step is calculation of the initial wind speed 
values (u0, v0, w0) at 3-dimensional grid system by interpolation of observed wind data. 
The interpolation of the horizontal components is calculated by the following equation: 
 
 
N- number of the proximate observations 
 
 
The second step is calculation of the mass-consistent wind field (u, v, w) using 
variational analysis and adjust the wind field to satisfy the mass continuity.  The model 
uses observed or predicted wind data as an input. The boundary conditions are “flow 
through” at horizontal boundaries, vertical velocity at the ground is zero and vertical 
velocity at the upper boundary is constant.  The air concentration and the dose model 
GEARN use a Lagrangian particle dispersion model. The movement of a marked 
particle is a sum of displacement of the mean wind and a random displacement due to 
the diffusion processes: 
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The horizontal diffusion coefficient is calculated using simple distribution function with 
Gifford’s standard deviation. The horizontal diffusion terms are defined through 
horizontal diffusion coefficient and a uniform random number. The vertical diffusion 
term is defined through vertical diffusion coefficients which depends on the 
stratification. The atmospheric boundary layer is up to 900 m and it corresponds to 
slightly unstable layer. The layer over 1000 m is assumed to be stable and the transition 
layer is a linear function between the boundary and the stable layer. 
 
Dry deposition is calculated by assuming different deposition velocities depending on 
the type of nuclide and the condition of the surface. The deposition velocity for Cs-137 
is 0.001 m/s, and for I-131 (aerosol) is 0.003 m/s. Wet deposition can be calculated by 
using a washout coefficient which is a function of rainfall intensity. The washout 
coefficient for Cs-137 is 5.0x10-5J0.8, where J [mm h-1] is rainfall intensity. The total 
surface deposition is a sum of wet and dry deposition. 
 
The accumulated external gamma dose is calculated from time-integrated air dose rate. 
Finally the accumulated 70 years internal dose accepted due to inhalation during the 
period of contaminated air passage can be defined. 
Input and Output Data, Units  
The model accounts for the complex source, terrain condition and non-uniform and non-
steady state of the atmosphere.  Input for WSYNOP and GEARN models are as follows: 
− The GPV (Grid Point Value) data for WSYNOP, which is provided by JAERI and is 
accessed automatically by the program  
− Geographical data, covering 2500 km x 2500 km, centered at Vladivostok with 
latitude of 43.1 degrees North and longitude 131.9 degrees East (these coordinates 
are used for fixing the release point) 
− Table of yields of iodine and xenon isotopes with reactor type (BWR or PWR), fuel 
burn-up and cooling time 
− Physical data of 60 fission products, fertile material and activated nuclides (nuclide 
names, decay constants, conversion factors of dose from nuclide concentration) 
− Starting date and time of calculation and duration of calculation for wind field 
system 
− Starting date and time of release, duration of analysis, step of calculation, duration 
of the particle release, release height, reactor type, fuel burn-up, time of reactor shut 
down 
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The output of the model is as follows: 
− wind field data in vertical mesh boundary and date and time to which it corresponds, 
serving as input for GEARN 
− radioactive concentration in atmosphere 
− radioactive deposition on ground surface 
− external dose data 
− internal dose data 
 
Units for input and output: 
  INPUT   
Latitude, longitude of 
release point 
Release height Release duration, step Release rates Fuel burn up 
Deg m days, hours, s 1 Bq/h MWd/t 
 
  OUTPUT   
Wind velocity Radionuclide 
Concentration 
Ground Deposition External Dose Internal dose 
m/s Bq/m3 Bq/m2 MSv mSv 
 
The plot program dhccw reads calculation results of WSYNOP and GEARN and 
produces graphical output. 
 
 
Analysis of the Results 
Atmospheric Nuclide Concentration and Dry Surface Deposition 
Nuclide concentrations were compared for the following input conditions: duration of 
the release -16 min, height of the release - 75 m, quantity of the released nuclide – a unit 
of 1 Bq. The code calculates the concentration every 6 hours after a hypothetical unit 
release of 1 Bq from a submarine facility located in southern Primoriye Kray (Figure 6). 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Concentration of 137Cs every 6 hours after the release, release duration 16 min 
height if the release 75 m 
A) SNW 
B) WNW 
C) CW 
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In the SNW (Figure 6a) case, the contaminated cloud reaches Japan in 12 hours, with 
the maximum concentrations over central Japan occurring 24 hours after the release. 
The maximum atmospheric concentration for 137Cs is 9.3x10-15 Bq/m3 per Bq released. 
The maximum atmospheric concentration values for other modeled nuclides 24 hours 
after the release are listed in Table 2. The contaminated air masses cover the central part 
of Japan and quickly pass over the populated territory. The residence timeover Japan is 
about 12 hours.  Under the WNW condition (Figure 6b), the contaminated cloud reaches 
Japan in 36 hours and the maximum value for 137Cs is about 3 times less than in the 
SNW case (2.8x10-15 Bq/m3 per Bq released). However, the contaminated cloud is much 
larger, covering almost the whole territory of the Japanese main island, and the 
residence time is over three days.  The third  (CW) case (Figure 6c) results in air masses 
that move over Korea and rotate over the southern portion of the Japanese islands. 
Korea is affected mainly in the coastal regions. The maximum concentration occurs 30 
hours after the release, over the sea, and the maximum values are comparable to those in 
the SNW (Table 2).  The residence time is longer due to the closed rotation system 
which does not permit outflow of the air masses.  The observed lower values of iodine 
nuclides (Table 2) are due to the shorter half-lives (133I – 20.8 h, 135I – 6.61 h). 
 
Table 2. Maximum concentration 25 m over the ground 
 
25 m over Japan Islands 25 m over Korea Max Radionuclide 
Concentration in Air 
(Bq/m3) Strong North Winds  
24 h after release 
Weak North Winds 
72 h after release 
Cyclonic North Winds 
30 h after release 
137Cs 9.3 10-15 2.8 10-15 7.5 10-15 
134Cs 9.3 10-15 2.8 10-15 7.5 10-15 
131I 7.2 10-15 1.2 10-15 5.1 10-15 
133I 4.3 10-15 1.8 10-16 2.6 10-15 
135I 1.2 10-15 1.6 10-18 4.8 10-16 
90Sr 9.3 10-15 2.8 10-15 7.5 10-15 
 
 
Ground deposition for the three wind conditions is shown in Figure 7. The largest 
affected territory is produced under the WNW case, with deposition occurring over the 
whole territory of Japan. In the other two cases, deposition occurs mainly in central 
Japan (SNW) and in Korea and South Japan (CW). The maximum values range between 
10-12 –10-13 Bq/m2 per Bq released. 
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Figure 7. Dry surface deposition of 137Cs 
A) SNW 
B) WNW 
C) CW 
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Figure 8. External doses of 137Cs. 
A) SNW 
B) WNW 
C) CW 
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Figure 9. Internal doses of 137Cs  
A) SNW 
B) WNW 
C) CW 
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External and Internal Dose 
The model calculates the 70 year accumulated dose due to inhalation and external 
gamma irradiation during cloud passage (Figures 8 and 9). Calculations were made for 
each of the selected nuclides after the contaminated cloud had passed completely over 
the examined region. The doses were calculated respectively up to 60 hours, 7 days and 
7 days for the SNW, WNW and CW cases (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Calculated external and internal doses [mSv] 
 
Nuclide 
Strong North 
Winds (SNW) 
60 hours (2.5 days) 
after release 
Weak North 
Winds (WNW) 
168 hours (7 
days) after release
Cyclonic Winds 
(CW) 
168 hours (7 days)  
after release 
 Japan Japan Korea Japan 
 Ext. dose Int. 
dose 
Ext. 
dose 
Int. 
dose 
Ext. 
dose 
Int. 
dose 
Ext. 
dose 
Int. 
dose 
I-131 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-19 >10-20 >10-19 
I-133 >10-20 >10-19 >10-20 >10-20 >10-20 >10-20 >10-21 >10-20 
I-135 >10-20 >10-20 >10-22 >10-22 >10-21 >10-21 >10-21 >10-21 
Cs-137 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 >10-20 >10-18 
Cs-134 >10-20 >10-18 >10-19 >10-18 >10—19 >10-18 >10-20 >10-19 
Sr-90 - >10-17 - >10-17 - >10-18 - >10-18 
 
Assuming 1 Bq release quantity for 137Cs and 134Cs, the external doses for the three 
wind conditions are similar.  All result in external irradiation doses of the order of 10-20 
mSv per Bq released.  The external dose depends on the concentration and the residence 
timeover the ground.  
 
The estimations showed that the concentration is three times higher in the SNW than for 
the other two cases, and the residence time is about one day.  In the case of WNW the 
concentration is three times smaller; however, the residence time is more than 3 days. 
The longer residence time offsets the smaller atmospheric concentration values in the 
WNW.  For the short lived nuclides as 133I and 135I the doses in WNW are negligible. 
The external gamma dose of 90Sr is zero because 90Sr is not a significant gamma-
emitter.  A similar dependence can be observed in the internal doses. The values for 131I, 
134Cs, 137Cs are about 10-18 mSv per Bq released for the the SNW and WNW cases, in 
conformity with the dependence of dose on both the concentration and the residence 
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time. The short-lived nuclides should not be considered in WNW condition.  The 
maximum internal doses are observed for 90Sr, which is a strong beta-emitter. 
 
In the CW condition the contaminated cloud reaches Korea and Japan 30 hours after the 
release, with wind velocities comparable to those of the SNW case.  As a consequence, 
it follows that the values for internal and external doses are also comparable. In the CW 
case the contaminated cloud moves between Korean coast and Japan and affects both 
countries almost equally (Table 3). 
Variation of Atmospheric Concentration with the Release Duration 
The main radionuclide release during the Chahzma Cove accident occurred in a period 
of less than one minute.  The subsequent fire resulted in the release of another, smaller 
fraction to the atmosphere for four hours. Simulations including different duration of the 
release at the submarine facilities in southern Primoriye Kray were carried out to 
estimate the effect of short and long release times. The code resolution permits a 
minimum release duration of 2 min (120 sec).  Calculations for 137Cs nuclide 
concentrations for the three meteorological conditions involving 16 min, 1 hour and 24 
hours release duration. The simulations for 16 min and 1 hour release do not influence 
upon the form of the contaminated air masses and max values of the concentration. The 
wind field is interpolated for every 6 hours and almost the same meteorological 
circumstances affects nuclide dispersion. The simulations for 24 hours continuous 
release of 1 unit bequerel showed that the concentrations are smaller but the residence 
timeover the Islands is longer.  In the case of WNW the contaminated air masses stay 
over Japan more than 4 days. It results in higher values for external and internal doses 
and ground deposition. 
Variation of Atmospheric Concentration with Changes in the Release 
Height 
According to [10] the thermal rise of a plume, assuming horizontal wind speed of about 
10 m/s in a case of neutral stratification of the temperature, can range from  45 m to 4.6 
km. The code simulates a point release, and calculations were made for 75 m, 950 m 
and for 2500 m corresponding to the Chazhma accident in a slightly unstable layer, a 
release in neutral layer, and a release in stable layer. The max concentration at level 25 
m over the ground for the both SNW and WNW can be observed in a case of 75 m 
release height (Table 4). 
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Table 4:  Max concentration of Cs-137 at different heights of the point release.   
Height of the release Strong North Winds (24 
hours after the release) 
[x10-15 Bq/m3] 
Weak North Winds (36 
hours after the release) 
[x10-15 Bq/m3] 
75 m 9.3 9.0 
950 m 7.6 8.0 
2500 m 1.6 2.0 
Vertical Distribution of Atmospheric Concentration 
Plots of atmospheric concentration of 137Cs at different height levels were evaluated. 
The simulations were done for 75 m release point and 16 min duration, and show the 
stratification of the plume at the time when the  maximum values occur over the 
territory of Japan. The concentration decreases continuously over the height of 1000 m, 
and the maximum concentration is shifted toward the wind direction in the levels above 
2000 m. In the boundary layer, the concentration varies and the maximum values are 
observed near the ground. 
Consequence Analysis for a Severe Reactor Accident  
The results obtained were applied to a hypothetical severe reactor accident.  NATO’s 
[8] calculated quantities of the radioactive fission product inventory remaining 5 years 
after submarine shutdown, assuming 8x1019 fissions, is as follows:   
137Cs - 3.5x1017 Bq 
134Cs 3.5x1016 Bq 
90Sr - 7.0x1016  
The estimated quantities of iodine nuclides [6] produced in an accident involving a 
freshly fueled reactor core, such as that involved in the Chazhma Cove accident, are as 
follows: 
131I - 2.9x1013 Bq 
133I - 6.2x1014 Bq 
135I - 1.84x1015 Bq.  
 
Application of the dispersion model described above, using these release quantities, 
results in a value of 3,200 Bq/m3 for the maximum 137Cs atmospheric concentration 
under the SNW case.  The external cloud irradiation dose and internal inhalation dose 
are on the order of 0.001 mSv and 0.1 mSv, respectively.  These results indicate that the 
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doses in Japan resulting from an accident on a nuclear submarine in Russia would be 
below the public limits. 
Concluding Discussion 
The WSPEEDI code developed in JAERI was used for assessment of the consequences 
for the neighboring to Russia countries after a hypothetical nuclear submarine accident 
at the submarine facilities in southern Primoriye Kray.  Meteorological conditions 
during the winter are usually described with predominant strong northwest winds, which 
are favorable for the northeast transport of cold air masses.  
 
The nuclide concentration, radiological doses and surface deposition were calculated for 
the three most common winter wind conditions over the Sea of Japan – Strong North 
Winds, Weak North Winds and Cyclonic Winds. The calculations showed differences in 
atmospheric concentrations over Japan due to the differences in the wind velocities as 
the max values were observed in the short transport of 12 hours. However, because the 
accumulated radiation doses are a function of the time-integrated atmospheric 
concentration, most nuclides display similar values in all of the three meteorological 
conditions due to the offset between atmospheric concentration and residence time of 
the contaminated cloud over the populated area.  In addition, a parametric analysis of 
selected input parameters was carried out to identify critical variables.  It was found that 
input of the point release in an unstable atmosphere (up to the boundary layer), or under 
long duration of the release (24 h), was the limiting case.  We conclude that in a 
hypothetical nuclear accident at one of the submarine facilities in southern Primoriye 
Kray, the most severe consequences will occur in meteorological conditions similar to 
these that we characterize as weak north winds, particularly if the release occurs over a 
long period and into an unstable boundary layer.   
 
Finally, we evaluated the impact of a hypothetical severe reactor accident.  Using the 
estimated quantities of the different nuclides from the NATO report on a hypothetical 
submarine accident at Murmansk and applying the quantitative values to our results,  we 
found out that the internal and external doses for Japan and Korea do not exceed the 
commonly accepted 1 mSv annual dose limit for members of the public.  However, our 
calculations and analysis do not evaluate doses due to long-term exposure to 
contaminated soil, and do not include wet deposition, which can result in increases in 
soil contamination and in the accumulated radiation dose.  The effect of long-term 
exposure to contaminated soils, particularly under the effects of wet deposition, are 
suggested as topics for further study.    
26 
 References 
1. Hirohiko Ishakawa, development of Worldwide Version of system for Prediction of 
Environmental Emergency Dose Information, WSPEEDI (III), J of Nuclear Science 
and Technology, vol. 31, No. 9, pp. 969 – 978, Sept. 1994 
2. Hirohiko Ishikawa, Evaluation of the Effect of Horizontal Diffusion on the Long-
range Atmospheric Transport Simulation with Chernobyl data, J of Applied 
Meteorology, vol. 34, No 7, July 1995 
3. Hiromi Yamazawa, Akiko Furuno, Masamichi Chino, Evaluation of a Long-range 
Lagrangian Dispersion Model with ETEX, Atmosph. Environment, vol. 32, No 24 
pp. 4343–4349,1998 
4. Jiacheng Zhang, Zhiguang Liu, Climate of China 
5. Joshua Handler, Preliminary Report on: Greenpeace Visit to Vladivostok and Areas 
around the Chazhma Cove and Bolshoi Kamen Submarine Repair and Refueling 
Facilities, Nuclear Free Seas Campaign, Greenpeace, Washington 
6. Makoto Takano, Vanya Romanova, Hiromi Yamazawa, Yuri Sivintsev, Keith 
Compton, Vladimir Novikov, Frank Parker, Reactivity Accident of Nuclear 
Submarine at Vladivostok, applied in the Appendix 
7. Misamichi Chino, Hirohiko Ishikawa, Hiromi Yamazawa, Haruyasan Nagai and 
Shigern Morinchi, WSPEEDY (Worldwide Version of SPEEDI) A Computer Code 
System for Prediction of Radiological Impacts on Japanese due to Nuclear Accident 
in Foreign Countries 
8. NATO/CCMS Pilot Study: “Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from 
Defence Related Installations and Activities”, Phase II: 1995-1998, Final Report, 
Vol. 4: “Environmental Risk Assessment for Two Defence Related Problems”, 
Report No. 227, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I–73 – I–75, Mar. (1998) 
9. NCEP/NCAR Reananalysis, Mean January 1000 mb Winds 1976–96, 
www.uea.ac.uk 
10. Scorer Richard, Dynamics of meteorology and climate, WILEY-Praxis Series in 
Atmospheric Physics 
11. Yu. V. Sivintes, V. L. Vysotskii, V. A. Danilyan, Radiological Consequences of 
Radiation Accident in a Nuclear-powered Submarine in Chazhma Cove, Atomic 
Energy, vol 76, No. 2, 19 
